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MR. GARLAND GOES TO OTTAWA:
COMMENTS ON RESTITUTION IN CANADA
THROUGH THE LENS OF GARLAND V.
CONSUMERS' GAS
Jeff Berryman*
Consumers' Gas is a wholly owned subsidiary of Enbridge
Consumer Gas, a Canadian energy conglomerate that has interests
throughout the world.1 It is one of the largest suppliers and retailers
of residential gas in Ontario with annual revenues over $1,767
million and 1.5 million customers.2 Gordon Garland is a customer of
Consumers' Gas. Unfortunately, like many consumers, he is
sometimes tardy paying his monthly gas bill. Consumers' Gas had a
policy of charging late payment penalties (LPP) of 5% of the unpaid
monthly bill if not received within 16 days of rendering its bill.
Between 1983 and 1994, Mr. Garland paid $75 in late payment
penalties. At some point, Mr. Garland realized that where a late
payment penalty was imposed, but the actual bill and late penalty
was paid within 38 days, the effective interest rate on the late
payment was above 60% per annum. Under Canada's Criminal
Code, it is an offense to "receive a payment or partial payment or
interest at a criminal rate." 3  A "criminal rate" is defined as an
effective annual rate that exceeds 60% per annum.4 On outward
appearances, it would appear that Consumers' Gas was guilty of an
offense, and that such LLP payments were illegal. Mr. Garland, as
* Professor of Law, University of Windsor, Ontario.
1. See Enbridge Consumers Gas: Company Info, at
http://www.cgc.enbridge.com/G/hub-companyinfo.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2002).
2. See id.
3. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347(1)(b) (1985) (Can.).
4. "Criminal rate" means an effective annual rate of interest calculated in
accordance with generally accepted actuarial principles that exceeds sixty
percent of the credit advanced under an agreement or arrangement. See id. §
347(2).
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representative, commenced a class action seeking to recover all late
payment penalties. The amount totaled $85 million, which with
interest now stands at approximately $110 million.
At first blush, on the facts above, it is easy to paint Mr. Garland
as a crusading consumer, fighting the good fight for all consumers
against a multi-national industrial giant. Mr. Garland has not
enjoined the assault on multi-nationals in the streets of Seattle or the
ramparts of old Quebec City; rather, he has engaged the battle in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Surely, if justice means anything
it should require the return of illegal payments.
In another part of Ontario, Jeff Berryman is also a customer of
Consumers' Gas. Unlike Mr. Garland, he is obsessive about paying
his bills and has never incurred a late payment penalty his entire life.
Up until recently, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) has regulated all
aspects of the gas retailing business in Ontario. 5 Under its statutory
authority, it has set rates for the gas retail industry including the
maintenance of "just and reasonable rates.., for the transmission,
distribution and storage of gas." 6 Pursuant to this authority, the OEB
had approved all of Consumers' Gas's rates including the LPP. The
amounts received by Consumers' Gas for LPP have been factored in
to determine the overall revenue requirements for Consumers' Gas
and what must be assessed to give a fair return on shareholder equity.
If Mr. Garland wins, it is most likely that either Mr. Berryman and
other customers, or the shareholders of Consumers' Gas will
indirectly pay the award.
Mr. Garland's case is currently before Ontario courts.7 It has
already been to the Supreme Court of Canada once and to the
Ontario Court of Appeal twice. The Supreme Court has now granted
the plaintiff leave to appeal this decision. Mr. Garland's case is
complex and the issues it raises straddle a number of substantive and
procedural areas in our civil law. However, its root is a restitution
issue, and its resolution says much about the state of unjust
enrichment in Canada.
5. See Ontario Energy Board Act, R.S.O., ch. 0-13, § 19(1) (1990)
(Can.), amended by ch. 15, § 2 (1998) (Can.).
6. Id.
7. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 127 (Can).
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Mr. Garland's first success at the Supreme Court of Canada was
in having the provisions of the Criminal Code apply to the LPP.8
However, it is important to consider exactly what was decided in that
case. Section 347 of the Criminal Code creates two offenses. 9 One
offense is committed when a person enters into an "agreement or
arrangement to receive interest at a criminal rate." 10 In this case,
there was no agreement relating to the extension of dredit." In fact,
Consumers' Gas wanted to actively deter customers from paying
their bills late, and thereby taking "credit." The other offense is to
''receive a payment or partial payment of interest at a criminal rate,"
and it is this offense of which Consumers' Gas was guilty.'
2
However, note how this arises: The LPP is a lump sum payment that
constitutes a criminal rate when it remains unpaid for 37 days after
being imposed.1 3 However, after that date, the rate drops below the
criminal rate. 14 Thus, it is the defaulting payer who in fact controls
whether the conduct is actually criminal. Although the defendant
argued this very point, the Supreme Court rejected this argument on
the basis that the payer's obligation to pay accrued immediately once
the LPP charge was imposed and that the ability to delay payment
could not be considered a "voluntary" act. 15 The plaintiff's evidence,
8. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 385
(Can.).
9. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347 (1985) (Can.).
10. Id. § 347(1)(a).
11. In dissent, Bastarache J. would not have found the LPP scheme within
the purview of section 347 on the basis that the scheme, although being a
penalty, was not pursuant to an "arrangement or agreement" and thus fell
outside the definition section of what constituted "interest" as defined by the
section. See Garland, 165 D.L.R. (4th) at 415 (Bastarache, J., dissenting).
12. See Garland, 165 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
13. The Criminal Code definition for interest states that it should be
calculated on an annual basis using generally accepted actuarial practices and
principles. On that basis, the effective rate for being one day late may be
anywhere from 520 to 5.4 billion percent. See Christopher C. Nicholls,
Protecting Goliath from David. Criminal Rate of Interest and Finance
Transactions after Garland and Degelder, 15 BANKING & FIN. L.J. 249, 275
(2000).
14. See id. at 275-78.
15. In Nelson v. C.TC. Mortgage Corp., (1984), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 139
(Can.), aff'd, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 749 (Can.), the court dealt with the reverse of the
situation in Garland. The debtor had exercised a pre-payment option on a
mortgage, thereby shortening the actual term of the loan and resulting in the
effective interest rate rising above the Criminal Code. The interest rate of the
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which was not challenged at this stage of summary proceedings,
indicated that 81% of customers had paid the LPP within 10 days,
well within the thirty-eight-day period. However, assuming a
restitution action exists, an immediate problem is whether a
restitution action would differentiate between these two classes of
payers. The 81% who pay within the thirty-eight-day period may
legitimately argue that there is an impoverishment that is unjust. On
the other hand, the 19% who pay after the thirty-eight-day period
may incur an impoverishment, but it cannot be said to be unjust in
that its imposition would not appear to offend section 347. Yet, the
moral quality and culpability of Consumers' Gas is identical in both
cases-namely to impose a late payment penalty upon the payers,
who delay the payment of their bills on time.
Armed with his first court victory, Mr. Garland sought to apply
it to his own circumstances and that of the class he represented. The
parties agreed to have a number of issues determined in summary
proceedings. Mr. Garland argued that he was entitled to bring a
restitution claim for a refund of his LPP. Consumers' Gas argued a
number of specific defenses based on provisions of the Ontario
Energy Board Act. Primarily, that because the LPP had been
approved by the OEB, this constituted a "good and sufficient"
defense and that the plaintiffs action amounted to a collateral attack
on the legislative powers delegated to the Board.16 Winkler J., the
trial judge, accepted both of these arguments. 17 Analysis of these
arguments is beyond the scope of this Article, but essentially,
Winkler J. found that the provision in the Ontario Energy Board Act
which conferred immunity against civil suit brought against a
loan over its contracted period was not criminal. This did not violate section
347 because the act of the debtor was truly voluntary in exercising the option,
and the transaction could not become illegal through a voluntary act of the
debtor. See also Degelder Constr. Co. v. Dancorp Dev. Ltd., (1998), 165
D.L.R. (4th) 417 (Can.) (mortgage rate found to give rise to interest at criminal
rate when calculated over term initially agreed, though not when calculated
over period during which credit was actually outstanding).
16. Ontario Energy Board Act, R.S.O., ch. 332, § 18 (1980) (Can.)
amended by ch. 15, § 25 (1998) (Can.), provides that "[a]n order of the Board
is a good and sufficient defence to any.., proceeding brought or taken against
any person in so far as the act or omission that is the subject of... [the]
proceeding is in accordance with the order."
17. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 377
(Can.).
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regulated industry for actions ordered by the Board, was
constitutional. The imposition of the LPP under the Ontario Energy
Board Act was within the "pith and substance" of provincial
jurisdiction and had only an incidental effect on the federal
government's exclusive jurisdictional competence over criminal law.
With respect to the collateral attack, Winkler J. found that the
Ontario Energy Board Act contained a full administrative process
which allowed public participation to determine the rate structure for
gas retailing to the public. Mr. Garland had not participated in this
process and sought to use this civil action to re-hear matters within
the OEB's exclusive competence. Consumers' Gas had no option
but to adhere to the rulings of the Board and should not be put into
the position of having to defend the Board's rulings.'
8
Although unnecessary for his judgment based on the above
findings, Winkler J. addressed the plaintiffs ability to seek
restitution. Winkler J. applied what has become the classic statement
of the unjust enrichment principle in Canada, taken from Peter v.
Beblow, 19 that there must be "(1) an enrichment [of the defendant],
(2) a corresponding deprivation [of the plaintiff], and (3) the absence
of a juristic reason for the [defendant's] enrichment. ' 2' The plaintiff
demonstrated both (1) and (2), but not (3). A juristic reason, defined
as "some underlying justification, grounded in a legal or equitable
18. The defendant also made two subsidiary arguments: One, that there is
recognized in Canada a "regulated industries" defense to a Criminal Code
violation whereby a party acting under the lawful authority of a valid
provincial regulatory structure is shielded from criminal sanction. Winkler J.
did not believe that this defense extended to the circumstances of this case.
The Criminal Code did not provide the latitude that other quasi-criminal
provisions provided where this defense had been successful. Two, Consumers'
Gas argued that they could claim protection under a particular provision of the
Criminal Code that had been enacted to give protection to persons who served
the Monarch but who turned out to be on the wrong side of a civil war.
Winkler J. summarily dismissed this defense.
19. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980 (Can.). The three-part test is an updated version of
the test articulated by Dickson J. in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 844
(Can.) ("[Flor the principle to succeed, the facts must display an enrichment, a
corresponding deprivation, and the absence of any juristic reason-such as a
contract or disposition of law-for the enrichment.").
20. Beblow, 1 S.C.R. at 987.
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base," 21 was present in this case because the LPP was specifically
authorized by the OEB. The Board's orders had not been directly
challenged by either of the parties and were therefore valid.
Mr. Garland immediately appealed to the Ontario Court of
Appeal. Here, he was more successful. The court reversed the trial
judge on the issues of collateral attack and whether section 18 of the
Ontario Energy Board Act provided Consumers' Gas a "good and
sufficient" defense to civil action. 22 The collateral attack doctrine
would apply only where the administrative board had made a
decision directly binding the particular plaintiff, who was seeking to
impugn the decision in collateral litigation. In this case, the OEB's
decision was made affecting Consumers' Gas and not the plaintiff.
23
Additionally, because the plaintiff would not have had any
opportunity to gain the relief it sought in these civil proceedings if it
was confined to a hearing before the OEB, its action was not a
collateral attack. Nor could section 18 be construed as authorizing
the Energy Board to mandate criminal conduct and then
alternatively, confer protection against civil suit.
The court's ruling on Consumers' Gas's defenses focused
attention on the plaintiffs claim in unjust enrichment.24  On this
issue, the court both disagreed with the trial judge and dissented
amongst its members. Speaking for the majority, McMurtry C.J.O.
accepted the three-part test for unjust enrichment as enunciated in
Peter v. Beblow, however, he disagreed with Winkler J. on whether
Consumers' Gas had received an enrichment. Since all of
Consumers' Gas's rates were set by the OEB, it could not be said
that they had been enriched when they had not retained the LPP as a
profit.2 V The amount collected from the LPP had been factored into
the rates set by the OEB such that its imposition did not amount to
any additional income received by Consumers' Gas.27 Any amounts
21. Winkler J. accepted this definition provided by Blair J. in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 717,
773 (Can.).
22. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 127 (Can.).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 147-50.
26. See id. at 148-49.
27. See id.
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received under the LPP had been passed on to all Consumers' Gas
customers in reduced gas rates.
28
With respect to the third part of the test, the absence of juristic
reason, McMurtry C.J.O. concurred with Winkler J. but for different
reasons. McMurtry C.J.O. accepted an expansive definition of what
constitutes an "unjust" enrichment from McLachlan J. in Peel v.
Canada:
29
First, the injustice lies in one person's retaining something
which he or she ought not to retain, requiring that the scales
be righted. Second, the required injustice must take into
account not only what is fair to the plaintiff; it must also
consider what is fair to the defendant. It is not enough that
the plaintiff has made a payment or rendered services which
it was not obliged to make or render; it must also be shown
that the defendant as a consequence is in possession of a
benefit, and it is fair and just for the defendant to disgorge
that benefit.3"
The majority believed that because Consumers' Gas was required by
statute to adhere to the rate scheme set by the OEB, and because it
was within the Board's ability to set the LPP as part of what was a
just and reasonable rate for consumers, it would be unfair to require
Consumers' Gas to now repay the LPP. 3 1 Additionally, the cost
implications of such an order, which would presumably be passed
onto all Consumers' Gas's customers, raised distinct and unique
public policy considerations as a result of the defendant operating in
a completely regulated environment.
32
Although Borins J.A. agreed with the majority on the
application of the defenses which Consumers' Gas had raised, he
dissented on the conclusions respecting the availability of the
plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim.33 Borins J.A. commenced by
adopting much of Professor L. Smith's analysis on the state of unjust
enrichment law in Canada and accepted that there were two
divergent approaches to defining the concept of "unjust
28. See id. at 149.
29. (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140 (Can.)
30. Id. at 165.
31. See Garland, 57 O.R. (3d) at 150.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 154 (Borins, J.A., dissenting).
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enrichment." 34 The narrow approach focuses upon reasons to reverse
enrichments. 35 Under this approach, the burden is upon the plaintiff
to establish an "unjust factor," often drawing from older and well-
established restitutionary forms of action.36 The wider approach
focuses upon reasons why the defendant should be entitled to keep
the benefit.37 The burden under this approach often lies on the
defendant to identify these factors, which are more pragmatic and
idiosyncratic. 38 Borins J.A. did not tip his hat at either approach. He
reviewed the rationale and interpretation given to the Criminal Code
criminal interest rate provision. He noted that this provision was
designed as consumer legislation. Contracts that included a criminal
interest rate had not been enforced on the grounds of illegality and
the criminal interest rate either severed, or was read down to comply.
The fact that the LPP has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada
to be in violation of the Criminal Code could not be ignored. To
allow Consumers' Gas retention of the LPP would be to allow it to
profit from a crime and from its own wrongdoing. The trial judge
had made an error in believing that the LPP was valid simply
because the plaintiff had not directly attacked the OEB's order.
Moreover, Borins J.A. argued that the majority's decision was
unsustainable because by allowing the OEB's order to constitute a
"juristic reason," they were ignoring the impact of the Supreme
Court's decision. In holding that the order authorized a criminal
interest, this constituted a criminal offense and was therefore
invalid.39 In addition, to allow the OEB's order to constitute a valid
juristic reason would be to allow a provincial regulatory agency to
override federal criminal law in violation of the constitutional
paramountcy doctrine. As Borins J.A. stated:
In my view, it would be wrong to say that the rate orders do
not provide [Consumers' Gas] with a defence under s. 18 of
the OEBA because they have been rendered inoperative by
the doctrine of federal paramountcy, and then to breathe life
34. See Lionel Smith, The Mystery of "Juristic Reason ", 12 SUP. CT. L.
Rsv. 211 (2000).




39. See id. at 173.
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into them for the purpose of finding that they constitute a
juristic reason for [Consumers' Gas's] enrichment.4 °
On the issue of whether Consumers' Gas had experienced a
benefit, Borins J.A. accepted the trial judge's conclusion that the
simple receipt of money constituted a benefit. However, the fact that
all of Consumers' Gas's rates were determined by the OEB raised
the possibility of a change of position defense to any restitution
action. Borins J.A. held that this defense was not available to a
wrongdoer and that it was simply another attempt to justify retention
of the LPP in contravention of the criminal law.4'
I have outlined Garland v. Consumers' Gas in some detail
because I believe it is illustrative of the developments of Canadian
law within the area of unjust enrichment in a number of respects:
What is a juristic reason, what constitutes a benefit, and how do these
concepts accommodate public policy concerns? The fact that
Canada's most senior provincial appellate court can arrive at such
divergent views on these issues is symptomatic of the conceptual
vicissitude in a number of areas.
The legal consequences that follow a breach of the criminal
interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code are notoriously difficult
to discern. The section itself was enacted to prevent loan sharking,
although it would appear it has rarely been used to that effect.42 The
majority of cases where the section has been invoked concerns
otherwise legitimate commercial transactions where a borrower
seeks to escape the enforcement of a contract's provisions alleging
illegality.43 Judicial approach to this issue has normally resulted in
the interest rate component of the contract being severed from the
contract in whole or in part.44 The decision to sever requires the
40. Id. at 176.
41. See id. at 176-77.
42. In fact, the section requires the Attorney General's approval before a
charge is laid and there have been few reported criminal prosecutions. See
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347(7) (1985) (Can.).
43. See Milani v. Banks, (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 557 (Can.); William E.
Thomson, Assoc. Inc. v. Carpenter, [1989] 69 O.R. (2d) 545 (Can.); see also
Stephen Antle, A Practical Guide to Section 347 of the Criminal Code-
Criminal Rates of Interest, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J. 323, 337-39 (1994) (discussing
conditions under which courts find severance possible); Mary Ann Waldron,
White Collar Usury: Another Look at the Conventional Wisdom, 73 CAN. BAR.
REv. 1, 16-18 (1994) (discussing test for severability).
44. See Antle, supra note 43, at 338.
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court to analyze several factors. 45 First, the court must determine
whether the policy of the Criminal Code provision will be subverted
46by severance. Second, the court must determine whether the
parties entered the arrangement with an illegal purpose from
inception.47 Third, the court must determine the relative bargaining
positions of the parties.48 For example, has the borrower been forced
to submit to a usurious lender without independent advice? Finally,
the court must consider whether the borrower will be unjustly
enriched as a result of not severing the interest term. 49 In such a
case, the whole loan is unenforceable and the borrower need not
return the principal advanced.50 A more recent development has
been the simple "reading down" of the interest rate so that it
conforms to the maximum permissible rate, namely 60%.51 This
approach was justified on the basis that the imposition of interest per
se was not illegal, and the parties to a loan were experienced
commercial entities, negotiating at arm's-length and with legal
advisors. 52 Apart from the obvious difference that Garland does not
involve a strict loan agreement (although ultimately it does engage
an extension of credit) applying the above criteria, it would seem that
the LPP term should be severed from the contract to supply gas.
Whether the LPP could be "read down" so that at any time where an
actual payment resulted in excess of the 60% interest threshold, a
refund of only the difference was paid, is problematic. There are
obvious problems in how the difference would be calculated.
However, there is an attraction to the idea that the OEB approval of
what constitutes a "fair and reasonable" LPP policy can be equated
to the bargain struck between commercial entities bargaining at
arm's-length. The OEB policy shores up any power imbalance
between the parties when entering the contract concerning the supply
of gas and the charges imposed. It was the lack of any imbalance
that motivated the trial judge to read down the interest rate so that it




49. See id. at 337-39.
50. See id. at 338.
51. See Transport N. Am. Express, Inc. v. New Solutions Fin.
Corp., (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 560 (Can.).
52. See id. at 571-72.
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conformed to the Criminal Code rather than severing the interest rate
clause completely.
53
There is an apocryphal story of an English tourist armed with a
city map who approaches a local Irishman seeking directions to some
church spire visible in the distance. The Englishman asks, "We are
here, but how do I get to there?" The Irishman replies, "Well, if I
wanted to get to there, I wouldn't start from here."
In Garland what is the "here" and the "there"?
A. Here
As a matter of contract law, the consequences of statutory
illegality are not always clear-cut. A distinction is first drawn
between those contracts entered into with the purpose of committing
an illegal act, and contracts that are either expressly or implicitly
prohibited by a statute. In the former category, the contract is
unenforceable where one or both parties had the intention upon
formation of the contract to commit the illegal act.54 In the latter
category, a further distinction is drawn between a contract that is
expressly prohibited and one that is implicitly prohibited. 55 In both
cases, the contract will be illegal and unenforceable, and the parties'
intent, whether to deliberately break the law or not, is irrelevant.
56
Before a contract is deemed illegal because of an implicit
prohibition, however, the court must be satisfied that finding the
contract illegal will advance the policies of the statutory scheme.
With respect to the explicitly prohibited category, this formal
classificatory approach may now have given way to a more
contextual approach. This approach seeks to balance the
consequences that flow from making a contract unenforceable for
illegality and the remedy being sought, against the policy and
objectives of the statutory scheme. 57 Under this contextual approach,
even an explicit statutory prohibition may not automatically result in
53. See id.
54. See Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775).
55. See Still v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [1998] 1 F.C. 549, 564 (Can.).
56. See id. at 567; St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., [1956] 3
All E.R. 683, 687 (Eng..); S. M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 572
(4th ed. 1998); John D. McCamus, Restitutionary Recovery of Benefits
Conferred Under Contracts in Conflict With Statutory Policy-The New
Golden Rule, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 787, 803 (1987).
57. See McCamus, supra note 56, at 803-05.
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a complete denial of relief on the basis of unenforceability to an
otherwise innocent party or one who is acting in good faith.
58
Thus, based on the above, the classification of Consumers'
Gas's conduct can have varying consequences. Section 347(l)(a) of
the Criminal Code suggests that the act of contracting itself is the
actual offense; thus, the subsequent agreement must be illegal from
its inception.5 9 If the case falls within the first category above, then
intent is important because the agreement cannot be enforced by
either party where they both intended to commit the offense, or by
the one who alone has the intent to commit the offense.
60
Section 347(3) creates an evidentiary presumption to the effect
that when a person receives a payment of interest at a criminal rate,
then she is deemed to have knowledge of both the nature of the
payment and its reception at a criminal rate. 61 Accordingly, the
receipt of the LPP in Garland creates a presumption that Consumers'
Gas had the intent to commit the offense. If the case falls within the
second category (i.e., that the LPP constituted a contract in violation
of an explicit statute), then intent would be irrelevant for the
purposes of contract law, and the contract would be illegal and
unenforceable per se under the classical approach.62 However, under
a contextual approach we would have to ask how declaring the
contract unenforceable would advance the policy of the Criminal
Code provision. It is this question that has lead courts to a policy of
severing the interest component from the credit contract itself.
In Garland, the plaintiff initially claimed that Consumers' Gas
had violated both section 347(1)(a) and (b).63 In the first case, the
58. I take this to be the effect of the decision in Still v. Minister of National
Revenue, [1998] 1 F.C. 549 (Can.). In that case, the court held that in spite of
an explicit statutory provision in immigration legislation that prohibited the
plaintiff from taking employment, her actual contract of employment was seen
to be valid for the purposes of determining an entitlement to unemployment
benefits under a different statutory regime. In the court's opinion, the policy
under the Immigration Act that prohibited employment would not be
jeopardized by treating it as valid for the purposes of unemployment benefits.
59. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347(1)(a) (1985) (Can.) ("enters
into an agreement or arrangement to receive interest at a criminal rate").
60. See McCamus, supra note 56, at 803.
61. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347(3).
62. See St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., [1956] 3 All E.R.
683, 687 (Eng.).
63. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 390
(Can.).
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Supreme Court of Canada did not find an infringement of section
347(1)(a) because there was no explicit agreement to extend credit
and the imposition of the LPP did not necessarily result in payment
of a criminal rate for all payers.64 However, the court did agree with
Garland's claim that Consumers' Gas violated section 347(1)(b).65
Section 347(1)(b) makes the "receipt" of payment the offense,
regardless of whether it is paid pursuant to an agreement with the
accused.66 Again, the presumption will assist in determining
criminal liability.
Section 347(l)(b) does not explicitly deal with entering into any
agreement or arrangement. 67 However, implicit within this provision
is a prohibition of agreements and arrangements that incorporate a
criminal interest rate pursuant to the definition of what constitutes a
"criminal rate" under the Code.68 Whether such an agreement or
arrangement is illegal and unenforceable would have to be based on
whether such a conclusion advanced the policy objective of the
statutory provision.
So far this Article has dealt primarily with the effects of
illegality on the enforceability of the contract. This aspect should be
kept distinct from the restitution aspects of the same transaction. In
the past, the availability of restitution for benefits bestowed, either as
money paid or services rendered, has closely followed the
contractual analysis. Once the contract has been found illegal,
attempts to recover have been met with the legal principles such as
ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no right of action arises out of a
shameful cause), and in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis
(where both parties are equally wrongful the position of the
defendant is stronger to deny recovery). 69  However, there are a
number of exceptions: (1) where the parties are not in pari delicto;
(2) where there is repentance before the contract is executed; and (3)
64. See id. at 410.
65. See id. at 410-13 (receives payment or partial payment of interest at a
criminal rate).
66. See Degelder Constr. Co. v. Dancorp Dev. Ltd., (1998), 165
D.L.R. (4th) 417, 431-32 (Can.).
67. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 457(1)(b).
68. See id.
69. See Still v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [1998] 1 F.C. 549, 557, 564
(Can.).
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where the claim is collateral but can be made independently of the
illegality. 0
John D. McCamus, in an important contribution, has recast the
restitution issues into what he calls a "new golden rule." 71 He asks
that we separate the contractual and restitution aspects. Following a
determination that a contract is unenforceable, we should then
explore whether the policy issues that animated us to deny contract
enforcement also warrants the denial of restitution. This calls for a
similar contextual approach as suggested above, to be used to
determine the contractual effects of illegal conduct on a contract, but
also includes issues peculiar to restitution. For example, McCamus
suggests that while it may be appropriate to deny a party
enforcement of executory obligations or its expectancy, it may not
justify retention of a windfall conferred pursuant to an executed
obligation prior to the illegality being determined.72
Garland invites a number of restitution responses. From a
contractual point of view, the illegality may lead to either the non-
enforcement of the supply contract or-and more likely-the
severance of the LPP provisions. However, from a restitution
perspective, does it also warrant denying a refund of the payments
Consumers' Gas received? An orthodox restitution response would
probably conclude that the facts in Garland fit within the context of
the recognized "not in pari delicto" exception and therefore
restitution would be allowed.73 In Garland, a bargaining imbalance
existed between the parties, and the plaintiff had little alternative but
to contract with Consumers' Gas for his heating supplies. Against
this is the fact that the OEB had consistently granted the use of the
LPP by Consumers' Gas. Consumers' Gas may have been unaware
of the Criminal Code violation at the time of proposing this LPP
scheme; however, they continued to impose it even after these
proceedings were commenced. Of course, it was always open to
Consumers' Gas to suggest an alternative method of quantifying the
LPP and to have that method approved by the OEB. Once approved
70. See id. at 567-68.
71. See McCamus, supra note 56, at 810 (now incorporated
into his book, PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION (1990)).
72. See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 71, at 369.
73. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 395
(Can.).
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however, Consumers' Gas would be bound to implement such a
scheme. 74 Under McCamus's "golden rule" approach, less attention
may be paid to establishing disparities in fault (the parties may well
be in pari delicto). Instead, greater attention would be paid to the
quality of the unjust enrichment, and how that unjust enrichment
necessarily impacts upon the policy concerning the avoidance of
usurious contracts.
In Garland, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded on its
interpretation of section 347 that:
[I]t is clear that there is no violation of s. 347(1)(a) in this
case. The arrangement between Consumers' Gas and its
customers does not, on its face, require the payment of
interest at a criminal rate. The payment of such interest
depends on the occurrence of subsequent events.75
The focus is on the act of receipt of the payment rather than on
whether the contract constitutes an illegality. From a restitution
standpoint, a claim should be mountable on the public policy
principle that no person should be able to benefit from his or her
criminal activity. This principle, of long standing, has been invoked
to deny a person, or others who claim through that person, from
profiting from heinous crimes such as murder and manslaughter.
76
For example, it has been invoked to deny a convicted person who
seeks to benefit indirectly from selling their story of a heinous
crime.77  It has also bedeviled insurance law and indemnity
74. There are few cases dealing with the refund of criminal interest. For
example, in Bon Street Dev. Ltd. v. Terracan Capital Corp., (1992), 76
B.C.L.R. (2d) 90 (Can.), Low J. adopted the passage from MADDAUGH &
MCCAMUS as accurately stating the law of restitution on illegal contracts and
the exceptions thereto. See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 71, at 349.
However, he declined to order the refund of criminal interest on the basis that
indeed the parties were in equal fault. See also Vandekerhove v. Litchfield,
(1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 739 (Can.), rev'd, (1995), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 571
(Can.) (noting that in Bon Street, "the parties were equally at fault in entering
into and completing the illegal contract.").
75. Garland, 165 D.L.R. (4th) at 410.
76. For a recent discussion of this policy in Canada, see the most recent
decisions of the Supreme Court in Oldfield v. Transamerica Life Insurance
Co., (2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.) and Goulet v. Transamerica Life
Insurance Co., (2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 22 (Can.).
77. See Rosenfeldt v. Olson, (1986), 1 B.C.L.R. (2d) 108 (Can.) (finding
the restitution claim unsuccessful in this case).
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78policies. However, it has rarely, if ever, been applied to other
forms of criminality.
Most restitution scholars accept that preventing a person from
benefiting from wrongdoing is one of two essential organizing
principles of restitution, and that profits from such wrongdoing
should be recoverable. 79 Difficulty arises, however, in making the
appropriate link between the perpetrator's crime and whether it was
committed at the expense of the victim. The citizen's duty to avoid
criminal or wrongful acts is owed to the State rather than the
individual victim. The State also assumes the primary function of
punishing aberrant behavior, and allowing a restitution claim to go
forward may have the appearance of recreating forfeiture and
attainder--common law actions that have been abolished in
Canada -- or impinge on the proper province of the legislature.81
However, in other areas where criminal sanctions have proved
inadequate, courts have been willing to supplement with civil
actions. 82 Maddaugh and McCamus suggest that restitution is only
justified where the party committing the wrongful act "has an
express motive of obtaining some benefit from his victim."83 This
need for "intent" is not obvious other than that it allows the
connection to be made between the wrongdoer and the victim such
that it is "wrongdoing... at the expense of... the victim."
84
Whether or not Consumers' Gas may be required to make
restoration to Garland on the basis of their criminal activity focuses
upon the following factors:
(1) Consumers' Gas has not been criminally convicted of
an offense although the tone of the Canadian Supreme
Court's decision suggests that they are in fact guilty.
78. See Oldfield, 210 D.L.R. (4th) at 1; Goulet, 210 D.L.R. (4th) at 22.
79. See, e.g., LORD GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
ch.38 (5th ed. 1998); MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 71, ch. 22.
80. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 6(1)(b) (1985) (Eng.).
81. See GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
561 (1999). The Criminal Code now contains quite detailed provisions on the
forfeiture and restoration of property that is the fruits of a crime. See Criminal
Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 491.1, 738.
82. See JEFF BERRYMAN, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 135 (2000)
(granting an injunction for continual flouting of a criminal statute).
83. MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 71, at 494.
84. G.H.L. FRIDMAN & JAMES G. MCLEOD, RESTITUTION 562 (1982). The
authors do not share this view and believe that intent is irrelevant.
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The evidential presumption contained in section 347(3)
clarifies the element of intent for the purposes of the
offense. 85 There is little doubt that Consumers' Gas
intended to impose the LPP on Garland.
(2) It is unlikely that Consumers' Gas will be criminally
prosecuted under the section. Such prosecution
requires the consent of the Attorney General, and
previous history suggests that it is seldom requested by
prosecutorial agencies or, when requested, given to
them.
(3) As a class action, it is likely that all the parties who
paid the criminal LPP are known, as are the amounts
they actually paid.
(4) The legislative provision is for the benefit of
consumers. The duty Consumers' Gas breached is not
one they owe to the State at large, but rather to their
consumers who have all been readily identified.
Restitution actions based on an illegal contract, or a public
policy preventing a person from profiting from a crime, both fall
within "benefits acquired through wrongdoing." However, these are
not the only potential restitution actions arising from the facts in
Garland. Arguably, the parties entered into the LPP arrangement
based on a mistake of law. Both Mr. Garland and Consumers' Gas
honestly and mistakenly believed that the LPP scheme, as authorized
by the OEB, complied with the provisions of the Criminal Code.
Any payment made under the LPP was not made as a compromise or
settlement of an honest claim, this being a recognized counter to an
action based on mistake of law.86 Further, the payment was arguably
made under a practical compulsion because the particular
circumstances gave Consumers' Gas a monopoly on the supply and
distribution of gas to Mr. Garland under the terms the OEB
85. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 347(3).
86. In Canada, the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law
was abolished by the Supreme Court in Air Canada v. British Columbia,
(1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 197-98 (Can.). See also Air Canada v. Liquor
Control Bd. of Ontario, (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 301, 328 (Can.) (appeal
allowed in part although the restitution aspect was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Air Canada v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario, (1997), 148 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, 214-16 (Can.)).
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approved. Mr. Garland's choice was to either not use gas, or to
avoid incurring any LPP by always paying his bills promptly.
A claim made under a mistake of law as constituting either an
"unjust factor" or "juristic reason" is one of autonomous restitution.
87
An enrichment and a corresponding impoverishment complete the
claim. The change of position defense assumes importance in
identifying whether there is an actual residual benefit that warrants
restoration. The majority in Garland approached the case as if unjust
enrichment was a cause of action that subsumes all claims in
restitution, even those based solely on wrongdoing. 88 The majority
thus elevated the "unjust enrichment" principle, as articulated in the
three criteria from Peter v. Beblow,8 9 to the substantive claim itself.
The receipt of the LPP as a criminal offense is but one factor to be
considered under the rubric of "juristic reason." The fact that it was
authorized by the OEB is seen as a stronger countervailing factor.
By subsuming restitution for wrongs, together with autonomous
restitution, the majority ignored the fact that a change of position
defense is normally unavailable for wrongdoers, whereas available in
a situation of autonomous restitution.
90
B. There
As demonstrated by the split decision in the Ontario Court of
Appeal, the "just" resolution in Garland is not intuitively obvious.
Let us consider what we know.
The defendant violated the Criminal Code. However, the
legislative intent behind the violated section was to catch loan
sharking agreements. Although the action in this case was not loan
sharking, the section has a general consumer protection orientation.
91
Critics have scathingly attacked the provision as ill-conceived
87. See GERALD MCMEEL, THE MODERN LAW OF RESTITUTION 4 (2000).
88. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 385
(Can.).
89. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 987 (Can.) (the criteria being enrichment,
corresponding deprivation, and absence ofjuristic reason for enrichment).
90. The allure of the unjust enrichment principle as the substantive cause of
action for all restitution actions is powerful in Canada and has tempted
members of our most senior appellate court. For example, see the discussion
on the legal basis for a constructive trust in Soulos v. Korkontzilas, (1997), 146
D.L.R. (4th) 214, 215 (Can.).
91. See Garland, 165 D.L.R. (4th) at 396.
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because it applies to transactions that are the products of parties
negotiating at arm's-length in a fair marketplace. 92 The fact that the
Attorney General's consent is required to prosecute has meant few
criminal prosecutions. The weight of the cases involve civil suits
that raise illegality and the non-enforcement of criminal interest
provisions. The illegality in this case depends on a rather technical
interpretation given to the Criminal Code, although the severity of
the infringement can work in an extreme fashion. The LPP scheme
had been approved by a provincial regulatory board charged with
ensuring the public interest.
The countervailing arguments focus upon the clear illegality of
Consumers' Gas's actions and the fact that it is improper for a
provincial regulatory body to consent to orders that violate valid
federal legislation. A wrongdoer should not profit from illegal acts
at the expense of another. 93 The illegal LPP assessed by Consumers'
Gas has enriched Consumers' Gas's customers in that rates for
distribution and purchase of gas have been lowered to reflect the fact
that LPP payments are available to meet part of Consumers' Gas's
working capital.94 (Query whether Consumers' Gas's shareholders
have been enriched. That determination would turn on the way the
OEB guarantees a return on shareholder capital and how savings
through productivity gains and management are reflected in
shareholder return. As a regulated industry, these benefits may not
automatically inure for the benefit of shareholders, but go to reduce
the cost of gas to consumers. In addition, the cost of providing credit
to customers who do not pay on time is a real cost to Consumers'
Gas. Any LPP may only cover the cost of providing consumers
credit and not constitute a saving of expenditure.)
I suggest the resolution of these two competing approaches
involves a three-step analysis: First, has the wrongful act been made
out? Second, does the alleged wrong require additional sanctioning
92. See Jacob S. Ziegel, Editorial, Section 347 of the Criminal Code, 23
CAN. Bus. L.J. 321, 321 (1994); Jacob S. Ziegel, The Usury Provisions in the
Criminal Code: The Chickens Come Home to Roost, 11 CAN. BUS. L.J. 233,
244 (1986).
93. See Oldfield v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., (2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 1
(Can.); Goulet v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., (2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 22
(Can.).
94. See Garland, 165 D.L.R. (4th) at 385.
Winter 2003]
798 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:779
by conferral of a restitution remedy? Third, has the requisite
elements of a restitution claim been established?
1. Has the wrongful act been made out?
Litigation is important for at least four purposes: to provide a
just resolution as between the litigants, to provide hortatory guidance
to those who legally advise others, to act as ombudsman against
those who wield power and influence, and to educate and publicize
socially desirable norms of behavior to the community. The
importance accorded these purposes varies with the dispute.
Generally, issues of autonomous restitution engage the first two more
than the latter two, because the goal is more likely to be centered on
corrective justice. Restitution for wrongs engages all four, but
particularly the latter two. The goal is more likely to reflect
distributive justice.
Like Borins J.A. in Garland, I believe we cannot ignore the fact
that Consumers' Gas's conduct is illegal. The wrongful act has been
made out.
2. Does the alleged wrong require additional sanctioning by
conferral of a restitution remedy?
Both Consumers' Gas and the OEB have accepted that the LPP
regime must be changed to ensure statutory legality. This will have
flow-on effects and, indeed, Toronto Hydro (a large municipal
authority retailing hydro also regulated by the OEB) was given
intervener status in this case because they had a similar LPP scheme.
Of course, this decision of the regulator and the regulated only arose
because the illegality of the LPP was brought to light. The court
admits that Mr. Garland could not have received a restitution remedy
from the OEB, although presumably he could have objected at the
time the LPP was first suggested.95 Mr. Garland was thus successful
in having the LPP annulled for the future. This leaves open the need
for additional restorative relief to sanction Consumers' Gas. The
public policy interests justifying further sanction are the broader
issues of ensuring that a wrongdoer does not profit from their wrongs
at the expense of others, and the furtherance of the legislative policy
behind the Criminal Code. A contextual approach to this question
95. See id.
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may look at the consumer protection aspect of the Criminal Code
provision, the degree of moral culpability of Consumers' Gas, the
sophistication of the parties, the length and systemic nature of the
wrong, and the extent of the benefit.
3. Have the requisite elements of a restitution claim been
established?
There is clearly an impoverishment of the plaintiff in Garland
although, as indicated before, it may not be in direct correlation to
the money paid to Consumers' Gas. The plaintiffs delay in making
payment had a real cost to Consumers' Gas. For those who paid
after thirty-eight days elapsed, no effective criminal interest rate was
levied. Thus, has there been a benefit?
Most writers in restitution accept that a payment of money, a
saving of expenditure, or a "request for performance" (as in
expenditures made in anticipation of a contract being formed)
constitutes a benefit. 96 Because money is universally exchangeable,
its payment is usually always seen as a benefit. The only reservation
in Garland is whether Consumers' Gas can plead change of position
as a defense in that, while they received the LPP, they never retained
any benefit and acted only as a conduit to transfer this benefit to
others.
A change of position defense has been accepted in Canada in the
case of mistake of fact and mistake of law for some time, although it
has never been worked through in any detailed analysis.97 At least
two conceptual positions have been identified as underlying a change
of position defense. The first focuses upon the attainment of a "just
and fair" result as between the parties in light of the defendant's
changed circumstances. 98 It admits that the plaintiff has suffered an
impoverishment and that the defendant was enriched, but now, the
changed circumstances confronting the court would create a further
injustice if the defendant was required to restore any benefit to the
96. See Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada, (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th)
140, 150-57 (Can.); GOFF & JONES, supra note 79, at 16; MADDAUGH &
MCCAMUS, supra note 71, at 38; MCMEEL, supra note 87, at 16; VIRGO, supra
note 81, at 67.
97. See RBC Dominion Sec., Inc. v. Dawson, (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 230,
234-40 (Can.); Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd.,
(1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 1 (Can.).
98. See Rural Municipality of Storthoaks, 55 D.L.R. (3d) at 13.
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plaintiff.99 As between the plaintiff and the defendant, there is no
valid reason why the defendant should be made to bear the losses.
This position appears loosely in the language of the American
Restatement of the Law of Restitution. °° The second position
focuses upon the nature of the enrichment in that any expenditure by
the defendant made as a result of receipt of the enrichment now
diminishes the original enrichment. 1 1 This position has generally
been recognized by academic writers as involving two distinct steps:
(1) a causative link between the receipt of the benefit and the
defendant's change of position, and (2) that the defendant's change
in position would make it inequitable for him or her to now be
required to restore benefits to the plaintiff.1
0 2
An initial threshold under either approach is whether a change of
position defense is available to a wrongdoer. Opinion is divided on
this issue. The disagreement appears about the type and extent of the
wrongdoer's moral culpability or fault needed to justify denying the
defense. Criminal wrongdoing usually involves moral turpitude.
Where the action is based on illegality-Consumers' Gas has never
been convicted of any offense against the Criminal Code-the
defendant may argue that they innocently engaged in the alleged
criminal activity. While this would be no defense to a criminal
charge, it does go to the issue of whether the additional sanction of a
restitution remedy is warranted in the first place. We return to the
issues surrounding the policy objectives behind the legislation that
make the agreement or conduct illegal and what civil response is
necessary and justifiable. If the factors that animated our decision to
allow a restitution action in the first place are to ensure that a
wrongdoer does not profit from their wrong, it would seem
anomalous to now allow a defense of change of position. Simply
put, if innocence has not protected the defendant from a finding of
illegality, or from a finding that restitution is necessary to further the
99. See id.
100. The formulation in GOFF & JONES, supra note 79, at 822, and following
Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1992] 4 All E.R. 331 (Eng.),
favors this approach.
101. See Ross GRANTHAM & CHARLES RICKETT, ENRICHMENT &
RESTITUTION IN NEW ZEALAND 333 (2000); Jonathan Dawe, The Change of
Position Defense in Restitution, 52 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 275 (1994).
102. See GRANTHAM & RICKETT, supra note 101, at 341; MCMEEL, supra
note 87, at 435; VIRGO, supra note 81, at 711.
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policy objective implicit in the legislation, then it should hardly
protect the defendant now by way of a defense.
Even assuming that a change of position defense is available for
a wrongdoer based on criminality or illegality, as currently conceived
in Canada, it is probably not available in Garland. There is some
similarity between Garland and the case of Rural Municipality of
Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. 103 In that case, the receipt of
royalties from the plaintiff had unjustly enriched the defendant
municipality. 10 4 The municipality had used these payments to fund
its general operations and, as a consequence, had set a tax rate on its
residents reflecting the revenue stream from the plaintiff.1 05  The
court denied a change of position to the municipality because the fact
of expenditure alone could not justify the defense. Expenditure
would have to have been for some extraordinary project that would
not have been undertaken but for receipt of the funds, before it could
constitute a change of position. 10 6 By comparison, Consumers' Gas,
as a regulated industry, can be likened to a public municipality. It
had absorbed the LPP into its revenue stream as part of its regular
operations and had not undertaken any particularly extraordinary
expenditure with the funds.
0 7
My arguments favor the dissenting opinion of Borins J.A. How?
There is another reason for favoring a restitution response in
Garland. If Consumers' Gas is required to refund the LPP, then this
will have obvious repercussions on its financial accounts. Surely,
this will be an issue before the OEB at Consumers' Gas's next
request for a rate adjustment. It is right that the problem should be
laid at the feet of the body that must claim some responsibility for its
incursion.
CONCLUSION
In Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada,10 8 McLachlin J.
posited a series of tensions in the development of restitution in
103. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Can.).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 6.
106. See id. at 13.
107. Dickson J. in dissent also rejected this same argument in Hydro Electric
Commission of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro, (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 195-
219 (Can.).
108. (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140 (Can.).
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Canada. In particular, she distinguished between two doctrinal
approaches: the "traditional category approach" (building upon
established categories where restitution had been awarded in the
past) and the "principled approach" (building upon the unjust
enrichment principle of benefit, impoverishment, and absence of
juristic reason).10 9 McLachlin J. also called for a third approach:
[O]ne which acknowledges the importance of proceeding
on general principles but seeks to reconcile the principles
with the established categories of recovery; one which
charts a predictable course without falling into the trap of
excessive formalism. 
110
The majority in Garland cogently illustrates what happens when
McLachlin J.'s approach is not followed. Specifically, the unjust
enrichment principle is threatened to be reduced to meaningless cant
if we are not careful to carry over or create new organizational
structures used to classify claims of restitution.
109. Id. at 151-52.
110. Id. at 153.
